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GLENN E. COVEN* 
Liabilities in Excess of Basis: 
Focht, Section 357( c) (3) 
And the Assignment of Income 
M OST businesses are permitted by the tax laws to incorporate their operations without the immediate recognition of taxable 
gain. 1 The decision of the Tax Court in Peter Raich,2 however, in effect 
denied this dispensation to those businesses using the cash method of 
accounting whose invested capital is exceeded by the sum of current 
and long-term liabilities.3 The seeming unfairness of this decision pre-
cipitated a series of judicial inquiries into alternative patterns of taxa-
ton that could be reconciled with the statutory provisions governing 
tax-free incorporations.4 \Vithout exception, these inquiries have fo-
cused on reinterpreting the incorporation sections of the Internal Reve-
nue Code. 
The need to construe the Code's incorporation provisions has resulted 
from the Internal Revenue Service's failure to apply to most incorpora-
tion transfers those general principles of taxation that prohibit the as-
signment of income. As a result, the nonrecognition provisions govern-
ing incorporation exchanges have controlled the taxation of items of 
current income and expense, a task for which they were not designed 
and are ill-suited. In this respect, incorporation transfers are not taxed 
in harmony with the general pattern of the Code. As a result of that 
disharmony, the Raicl~ problem has not been satisfactorily resolved. In-
deed, the recently adopted congressional solution5 has significantly and 
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee. B.A. (1963), Swarth-
more College; LL.B. (1966), Columbia University. 
The author wishes to express his appreciation to his colleague Professor Dur-
ward S. Jones for his thoughtful suggestions and criticisms at various stages in the 
preparation of this Article. 
1 See I.R.C. § 351 (a). 
2 46 T.C. 604 (1966). 
3 See text accompanying notes 19-23 infra. 
4 See note 32 infra. 
5 Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 365 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 357 
(c)(3), 358(d)(2)) (codifying the result in Focht v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 
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needlessly complicated the taxation of incorporation exchanges with-
out achieving a rational pattern. 
This Article contends that the assignment of income doctrine should 
be applied to incorporation transfers, and that the present patchwork of 
solutions should be abandoned. If the doctrine were so applied, the 
Raich problem would simply disappear, and the taxation of incorpora-
tion exchanges would conform with the general structure of the Code. 
I 
THE Raich PROBLEM 
The traditional view of the Raich problem has been fully set forth in 
the literature6 and need be only summarized here. In its relatively early 
opinions in United States v. H endler1 and Crane v. C ommissioner,8 the 
Supreme Court established that on the sale or exchange of property, 
the assumption by the transferee of an obligation of the transferor con-
stituted a further payment in consideration of the transfer in the amount 
of the liability assumed. Consider, for example, property that has a $60 
tax basis and a $100 gross value, and that is subject to a $30 note and 
mortgage. If such property were transferred in exchange for $70 in 
cash and the transferee's agreement to assume the transferor's obliga-
tions on the note and mortgage, then the total amount realized on the 
exchange would be $100,9 with a $40 gain realized by the transferor.10 
In effect, the transferor is treated as having received $100 in cash and 
then discharging its own obligation, and the transferee is treated as 
having paid $100 in cash and then refinancing the property. Further-
more, the Supreme Court has indicated that this treatment of the as-
sumption of indebtedness is applicable not only to taxable sales and 
exchanges, but also to those corporate reorganizations that Congress 
has determined should otherwise be tax-free.U 
Treating the assumption of liabilities as further payment in a tax-
able transaction was regarded as necessary to the structure of the tax-
ing act and did not appear to produce undesirable side effects. When 
223 (1977), appeal dismissed, No. 78--1118 (3d Cir. Mar. 23, 1978) ). See text ac-
companying notes 34-42 infra. 
6 See, e.g., Del Cotto, Section 357( c): Some Observations on Tax Effects to the 
Cash Basis Transferor, 24 BuFFALO L. REV. 1 (1974); Kahn & Oesterle, A Defini-
tion of "Liabilities" in Internal Revenue Code Sections 357 and 358(d}, 73 MrcH. 
L. REV. 461 (1975); Note, Incorporating a Cash Basis Business: The Problem of 
Section 357(c), 34 WAsH. & LEE L. REV. 329 (1977). 
7 303 U.S. 564 ( 1938). 
B331U.S.1 (1947). 
9See I.R.C. § 1001(b). 
10 See I.R.C. § 1001 (a). 
11 United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. at 566. 
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applied to reorganization exchanges, however, the results were disas-
trous. The law provided that upon the incorporation of a business, or in 
another reorganization exchange, if the transferor of property received 
only stock or securities in the transferee corporation, then no gain would 
be recognized and the entire tax would be deferred.12 The receipt of any 
other property, however, would be subject to tax.13 Since in a reorgani-
zation exchange the assumption of indebtedness would not constitute a 
transfer of stock or securities, but rather a transfer of "other property," 
the assumption of liabilities of the transferred business would produce 
a tax to the transferor. Because the capital structure of many businesses 
contained substantial liabilities that could not be discharged prior to re-
organization, without liquidation of a major portion of the business's as-
sets, the effect of Hendler was to deny tax-free reorganization treat-
ment to most taxpayers.14 
Congress promptly responded by amending the reorganization provi-
sions to extend deferral of tax on reorganization exchanges to the re-
ceipt of an assumption of indebtedness.15 Rather than taxing the amount 
of the assumption at the time of the exchange, Congress provided that 
the tax basis that the transferor would otherwise obtain in the stock or 
securities received in the exchange would be reduced by the amount of 
the assumption of indebtedness, thus ensuring that the tax deferred at 
the time of the exchange would be collected upon any subsequent tax-
able disposition of the affected stock or securities.l6 In effect, Congress 
provided that the value received by the transferor upon the assumption 
of its liabilities would be treated as a return of its investment, rather 
than its gain. 
In the original legislation, Congress failed to provide for the possi-
bility that the amount of the liabilities assumed would exceed the tax 
basis of the properties transferred. A period of confusion resulted dur-
ing which it was uncertain whether in such a situation the transferor 
should be assigned a negative basis for its stock or, notwithstanding the 
general deferral of tax, recognize a gain to the extent that the liabilities 
assumed exceeded the basis of the properties transferred.17 Since the 
policy of nonrecognition could not reasonably be extended to defer 
12 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 112(b) (3), (5), 53 Stat. 37 (now I.RC. 
§§ 354(a) (1), 351 (a)). 
13 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 112(c) (1), 53 Stat. 39 (now I.R.C. §§ 351 (b), 
356(a) (1) ). 
14 H.R REP. No. 855, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1939), reprinted in 1939-2 C.B. 
518-19. 
15 Revenue Act of 1939, § 213(a), 53 Stat. 870 (adding§ 112(k) to Int. Rev. 
Code of 1939) (now I.R.C. § 357(a)). 
16 Revenue Act of 1939, § 213(d), 53 Stat. 871 (adding§ 113(a) (6) to Int. Rev. 
Code of 1939) (now I.R.C. § 358). 
17 See Easson v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1961). 
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taxation when an amount exceeding the tax basis has been withdrawn 
from an investment, Congress again amended the reorganization provi-
sions to require taxation of the excess.18 
Soon after the adoption of this rule in section 357 (c) of the Code/9 
it became apparent that many businesses employing the cash method of 
accounting20 would have liabilities substantially exceeding the tax basis 
of the business properties to be transferred, since the accounts receiv-
able, not having been subject to tax, would have a basis of zero. Imposi-
tion of tax in these circumstances was said to be unfair : \vhile accounts 
receivable were effectively ignored, accounts payable were fully treated 
as liabilities.21 This disparate treatment was first attacked in Raich, a 
case involving incorporation of a cash method sole proprietorship under 
section 351. The liabilities assumed in the exchange consisted primarily 
of accounts payable and substantially exceeded the tax basis of the 
properties transferred, although the dollar amount of receivables trans-
ferred exceeded the amount of the assumed liabilities.22 Since the tax-
payer was unable to develop a persuasive theory to relieve himself from 
taxation, the Tax Court applied section 357 (c) literally and taxed the 
transferor on the full amount by which the liabilities exceeded basis. In 
so doing, the court reached a result that is now uniformly recognized as 
erroneous.23 
The facts of Raich and the effect of the Tax Court's initial solution 
18 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 1, § 357(c), 68A Stat. 117. For an analysis of the 
conflicting considerations and a criticism of§ 357 (c)'s resolution, see Cooper, Neg-
ative Basis, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1352 (1962). 
19 Unless otherwise indicated, all references herein to sections and subsections 
are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended. 
20 Under the cash method of accounting, which is specifically authorized by 
I.R.C. § 446(c) (1), a taxpayer is generally required to report items of income and 
expense for the year in which the income is actually or constructively received in 
cash or its equivalent, or the expense is paid. See Treas. Reg.§ 1.446-1(c) (1) (i) 
( 1957). The other principal method of accounting is the accrual method, which is 
authorized by I.R.C. § 446(c) (2). Pursuant to the accrual method, items are re-
ported for the year in which all the events have occurred that establish either the 
right to payment or the fact of liability, provided the amount thereof can be ascer-
tained with reasonable accuracy. See Treas. Reg. § 1.466-1(c) (1) (ii) (1957). 
Thus, an accrual method taxpayer would report the income represented by an ac-
count receivable at the time of sale, but a cash method taxpayer would report the 
income only upon collection of the receivable. Similarly, an accrual method tax-
payer would report an expense at the time of purchase, but a cash method taxpayer 
would report the expense only upon payment. 
21 See Bongiovanni v. Commissioner, 470 F.2d 921, 924-25 (2d Cir. 1972) (tax-
payer's argument); Peter Raich, 46 T.C. 604,607-10 (1966). 
22 46 T.C. at 605. 
23 See, e.g., Bongiovanni v. Commissioner, 470 F.2d 921, 924 (2d Cir. 1972) ; 
Kahn & Oesterle, supra note 6, at 464-67; Comment, Section 357 (c) and the Cash 
Basis Taxpayer, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 1154, 116~9 (1967). 
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can best be illustrated by a simplified example. The following illustra-
tion assumes that an individual cash method transferor exchanges the 
enumerated properties for stock and the agreement of the transferee 
corporation to assume all of the liabilities of the contributed business. 
The balance sheet of the unincorporated business immediately prior to 
the exchange is as follows: 
Assets Liabilities 
Accounts Receivable $20 Accounts Payable $40 
Equipment $35 Net Worth 
Capital $15 
For simplicity, the equipment is assumed to have a tax basis, book 
value, and fair market value all equal to $35. It is also assumed that 
the entire amount of the accounts payable would be deductible if paid 
by the transferor prior to the exchange.24 Assuming an arm's length 
transfer, the value of the stock received would be $15. Under Hendler 
and Crane, the $40 assumption of liabilities must be added, producing 
an amount realized of $55. Subtracting the transferor's $35 basis in the 
properties produces a realized gain of $20. Pursuant to section 351, this 
gain would be recognized only to the extent that the transferor received 
property other than stock or securities in the transferee. Under the 
general rule of section 357 (a), the amount of the liabilities assumed 
would not be regarded as "other property" subject to tax, but under 
section 357 (c) the excess of the liabilities assumed over the basis of the 
properties transferred, or $5, would be subject to tax. The transferor's 
basis in the stock received in the exchange would be zero,25 and the 
properties transferred to the corporation would acquire a tax basis of 
$40.26 
Prior to the transfer, had events taken their normal course, the trans-
feror would have been in a tax loss position. By hypothesis, the transfer-
or had an unrecovered investment in the equipment of $35, but the net 
worth of the business was only $15. If the transferor had not incorpo-
rated, this loss would have been recognized through the collection of 
$20 of taxable income and the payment of $40 of deductible liabilities. 
Immediately after incorporation, through the operation of sections 351, 
358, and 357, as constructed in Raich, the transferor owned stock worth 
$15 which had a tax basis of zero. In addition, the transferor had been 
subjected to tax on $5. In effect, the potential income from the accounts 
24 Deductible payables include current interest and taxes, in addition to most 
operating expenses such as salaries and supplies. See I.R.C. §§ 162, 212. 
25 I.R.C. § 358(a) (1), (d) (a substituted basis of $35 from the properties 
transferred, reduced by the $40 of liabilities assumed, and increased by the $5 rec-
ognized gain) . 
26 I.R.C. § 362(a) (a $35 carryover basis increased by the $5 gain). 
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receivable had been partly taxed, and partly deferred in the basis adjust-
ment to the stock received by the transferor. Any tax benefit from the 
potential deduction, however, had been lost.27 Indeed, the transferor's 
tax position had been converted from a position of loss to a position of 
gain. Since the purpose of section 351 and related sections is merely to 
defer recognition of gain or loss, this result is clearly wrong on princi-
ple.2s 
When the transferee assumes a nondeductible liability29 in a section 
351 exchange, the inadequacies of the Raich approach disappear. If the 
liabilities in our illustration had been nondeductible, the transferor 
would have a gain of $20 inherent in the business property prior to the 
exchange.30 Thus, the result in Raich of taxing the transferor on a gain 
of $5 and deferring a further gain of $15 would leave the transferor in 
the correct position. Furthermore, if section 351 were properly ap-
plied to the exchange, the gain inherent in the properties acquired by 
the transferee would equal the gain deferred in the stock acquired by 
the transferor.31 Since the transferee's basis of $40 in properties hav-
ing a value of $55 defers a gain of $15, the transferee also would be left 
in the correct position. 
II 
THE SEARCH FoR A SoLUTION 
A. By the Judiciary 
Presumably because the literal language of section 357 (c) seemed to 
produce the proper result when the assumed liabilities were nondeduct-
ible, the Raich problem was regarded as stemming from the deductible 
character of the liabilities, and the search for a solution was so focused. 
27 Aside from the special problem considered herein, it is entirely possible for a 
taxpayer in a § 351 exchange to be subject to tax upon the receipt of cash "boot," 
even though in the aggregate the transferred properties are depreciated in value. 
Each item of transferred property is treated separately; although the cash allo-
cated to the appreciated assets is taxable as "other property," the loss on the de-
preciated assets is not recognized. See I.R.C. § 351 (b); Rev. Rul. 68-55, 1968-1 
C.B. 140. When the loss is inherent in fixed assets, however, § 358 functions prop-
erly, preserving the loss in the substituted basis of the stock received. 
28 See text accompanying notes 119-21 infra. 
29 For example, a borrowing by the transferor, such as a bank loan, a purchase 
money mortgage, or a public issue of debentures, is such a liability. 
30 Of course, the net worth of the business would remain $15. In the process of 
incurring a nondeductible liability, however, such as a loan, the transferor would 
have received cash upon which it was not taxed. Therefore, the cash must be taken 
into account with the $15 in stock to measure the gain or loss. Accordingly, the 
transferor's total receipts of $55 would exceed its investment, or tax basis, of $35 
by $20. 
31 This is the function of the carryover basis prescribed by I.R.C. § 362(a). 
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In a series of cases after Raich, a variety of judicial opinions were ex-
pressed on why, and to what extent, deductible and nondeductible lia-
bilities might be treated differently for the purposes of section 357 (c) .82 
In 1975, Kahn and Oesterle developed a theoretical basis for such a dis-
tinction,33 setting the stage for Focht v. Commissioner.34 Reexamining 
the early cases that had precipitated the problem, the authors noted that 
in Crane the government had not asserted that the purchaser's assump-
tion of the seller's obligations with respect to deductible items, such as 
interest, constituted an amount realized on the sale. The government had 
not required the reporting of income from the assumption and offsetting 
deduction, but rather had chosen to ignore both items, permitting, in ef-
fect, a netting of the items prior to computing the amount realized. From 
this and similar evidence the authors concluded that in enacting section 
357 (c), Congress intended that the only assumed liabilities to be taken 
into account for any purpose in a section 351 exchange are those that 
in a taxable sale or exchange under Crane would be treated as an addi-
tional amount realized.35 Thus, deductible liabilities should be ignored 
in applying sections 357 and 358. 
This analysis, which was accepted by a majority of the Tax Court in 
Focht, would substantially change the results in our illustration. Since 
the liabilities to be taken into account36 no longer exceed the basis of the 
properties transferred, the transferor would recognize no gain on the 
exchange. With the deductible liabilities ignored, the transferor's tax 
basis for the stock received would simply be the substituted basis of the 
properties transferred, which was $35.37 The transferee corporation 
32 In Bongiovanni v. Commissioner, 470 F.Zd 921 (2d Cir. 1972), rev'g 30 
T.C.M. ( CCH) 1124 ( 1971), the court concluded that the liabilities referred to in§ 
357(c) were" 'tax' liabilities, i.e., liens in excess of tax costs .... The payables of a 
cash basis taxpayer are liabilities for accounting purposes but should not be con-
sidered liabilities for tax purposes under Section 357(c) until they are paid." ld. 
at 924 (emphasis in original). This solution appears to be approaching the latest 
position of the Tax Court. See text accompanying notes 34-42 infra. In Thatcher 
v. Commissioner, 533 F.Zd 114 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'g 61 T.C. 28 (1973), the court 
accepted the Raich solution on the exchange itself. It then allowed the transferor a 
deduction upon the transferee's payment, within the year, of the assumed accounts 
payable. The court limited the deduction to the amount of the transferred accounts 
receivable that were collected by the transferee during the year. 
33 Kahn & Oesterle, st~Pra note 6. 
34 68 T.C. 223 (1977). 
35 This solution goes far beyond the problem posed by Raich, as would the solu-
tion suggested herein. See note 86 infra. Disregarding deductible liabilities would 
increase the transferor's basis in the stock received regardless of whether the lia-
bilities exceeded basis. 
3 6 In our illustration, no liabilities would be taken into account. See text ac-
companying note 24 supra, 
37 I.R.C. § 358(a) (1), (d). 
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similarly would acquire a carryover basis of only $35.38 
The Tax Court explained that from the transferor's perspective, the 
result reached was as if the transferee had paid cash in the amount of 
the deductible liabilities assumed, and the transferor had discharged its 
own obligations.39 With one added qualification this summary explana-
tion is correct: both the income and the deduction that would have been 
generated by an actual cash payment are deferred in the basis of the 
stock received and are thereby converted from ordinary to capital gain 
and loss. If $40 in cash had actually been paid in lieu of the assumption 
of liabilities, the transferor would have recognized the full gain inherent 
in the properties transferred, which was $20.40 This amount would have 
been taxable as ordinary income.H Upon use of the cash to discharge its 
obligations, the transferor would have been entitled to a deduction 
against ordinary income in the full $40 amount of the discharged liabili-
ties. The resulting hypothetical net deduction of $20 is equal to the 
unrealized loss in the stock actually received, that is, the excess of its $35 
basis over its $15 value. This approach would charge the transferor not 
only with the gain inherent in the accounts receivable but also with the 
loss inherent in the accounts payable. The problem of recognizing gain 
to the transferor, which arose from treating the unaccrued accounts 
payable as liabilities yet giving no effect to unrealized accounts receiv-
able, is eliminated.42 Clearly, this result is far superior to the inequitable 
result in Raich. 
B. By Congress 
The Focht result, although perhaps not its analysis, was embraced by 
Congress with surprising speed. The last minute legislative scramble in 
October, 1978, produced several pieces of tax legislation. One of them, 
the Revenue Act of 1978,43 added a new paragraph, ( 3), to section 
357 (c) and amended section 358 (d) to codify, and somewhat refine, 
the treatment of liabilities adopted in Focht. New section 357 (c) ( 3) 
provides: 
(3) CERTAIN LIABILITIES EXCLUDED.-
(A) IN GENERAL.-If-
(i) The taxpayer's taxable income is computed under 
the cash receipts and disbursements method of account-
ing, and 
ss I.R.C. § 362(a) (1). 
39 68 T.C. at 236. 
40 I.R.C. § 351 (b) (1). 
41 The nature of the gain recognized is determined by the character of the prop-
erties transferred. 
42 Indeed, gain attributable to the assumption of the payables is eliminated re-
gardless of whether any accounts receivable are transferred. 
43 Pub. L. No. 95~00. 
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(ii) such taxpayer transfers, in an exchange to which 
section 351 applies, a liability which is either-
( I) an account payable payment of which would 
give rise to a deduction, or 
(II) an amount payable which is described in sec-
tion 736(a), 
then, for purposes of paragraph ( 1), the amount of such lia-
bility shall be excluded in determining the amount of liabili-
ties assumed or to which the property transferred is subject. 
(B) EXCEPTION.-Subparagraph (A) shall not ap-
ply to any liability to the extent that the incurrence of the lia-
bility resulted in the creation of, or an increase in, the basis of 
any property. 
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In addition, the existing section 358 (d) became section 358( d) ( 1), 
and a new section, 358(d) (2), was added providing: 
(2) EXCEPTION.-Paragraph (1) shall not apply to the 
amount of any liability excluded under section 357 (c) ( 3). 
1. Uncertain Scope of the Amendment 
These new provisions plainly resemble both the approach and result 
in Focht. Deductible liabilities are ignored in determining liability for 
tax under section 357 (c) and in adjusting the basis of the stock re-
ceived by the transferor. There are significant differences, however, be-
tween Focht and these provisions. The decision in Focht rested on the 
principle that the assumption of deductible liabilities should not produce 
an additional amount realized. While that principle may be criticized-
the government's concession in Crane may have been more of a shortcut 
expedient than a matter of principle-the Focht decision attempted at 
least to achieve an internal consistency within the Code. Thus, the Tax 
Court specifically asserted that its redefinition of the term liabilities was 
applicable for all purposes of sections 357 and 358.44 Indeed, one of the 
most disturbing aspects of Focht was the possibility that the term would 
consequently have to be redefined, or at least reexamined, in each of its 
occurrences throughout the Code.45 
The foundation for the amendment of sections 357 and 358 is far less 
clear. The Senate Report accompanying the legislation twice states that 
the provision "would codify the approach taken by the Tax Court in 
Focht." 46 The rule of new section 357 (c) ( 3), however, is by its terms 
only applicable for the purposes of section 357 (c), the provision impos-
ing a tax on the excess of assumed liabilities over basis, and then only 
for the purposes of section 351 exchanges. 47 These limitations appear 
44 68 T.C. at 238. 
45 Judge Hall, dissenting in Focht, expressed this concern in noting that the 
term liabilities appeared 400 times in the Code. !d. at 244. 
46 S. REP. No. 95-1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 185 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 
SENATE REPORT]. 
47 I.R.C. § 357(c) (1) is also applicable to transiers in typeD reorganizations. 
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wholly inconsistent with the principle adopted in Focht. The Senate 
Report further states that the provision "is not intended to affect the 
definition of the term liabilities for any other provision of the Code, in-
cluding sections 357 (a) and 357 (b) ."48 This statement is clearly am-
biguous. It may be read as neutral: Congress is taking no position on 
the Focht analysis and is content to allow further judicial development 
of the definition of the term liabilities for purposes other than section 
357 (c). 49 On the other hand, the statement may be read as affirmatively 
limiting the change in the law to section 357 (c) and prohibiting 
judicial redefinition of the term liabilities when appearing elsewhere. 
The clear implication of this construction of the Report would be that 
elsewhere the term retained a different meaning; presumably that mean-
ing would be the one assigned to the term liabilities in Raich. Accord-
ingly, it is uncertain whether in adopting section 357 (c) ( 3) Congress 
has indicated a willingness to accept Focht's broad application of the 
new meaning of the term liabilities or has rejected that analysis. As a 
result, the tax consequences of transactions not covered by section 
357 (c) ( 3) are in doubt. Since the amendment is applicable only pros-
pectively,50 the greatest area of doubt is that surrounding section 351 
exchanges occurring prior to October, 1978.51 
Unfortunately, neither construction is satisfactory. If it is concluded 
that the Focht redefinition is not necessarily limited to section 357 (c) 
( 3), then the Code will contain a restrictive definition of liabilities that 
is ostensibly applicable only to specific provisions, although the same 
word elsewhere may acquire the same restrictive meaning. Thus, in 
time, sections 357 (c) ( 3) and 358 (d) (2) will be rendered meaningless. 
Although such a result is theoretically desirable, nothing could be more 
confusing or more likely to trap the unwary. 
The alternative is that Congress intended section 357 (c) ( 3) to be 
If a corporate transferor in a§ 351 exchange distributes the securities it receives to 
its shareholders, the transaction may constitute both a § 351 exchange and a type D 
reorganization. I.R.C. §§ 351 (c), 368(a) (1) (D). Since there is no provision co-
ordinating these two provisions, it is unclear whether, in the situation described, 
§ 357(c) (3) is applicable. 
48 SENATE REPORT, supra note 46, at 185. 
49 Some support for this construction can be found elsewhere in the Report, 
where the reason for the amendment is given as the need to resolve ambiguities of 
definition that several decisions following Raich had created. I d. at 184-85. 
50 Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 36S(c). 
51 Regardless of this ambiguity, the Internal Revenue Service may choose to 
permit transferors in exchanges occurring prior to October, 1978, to report their 
gain in accordance with Focht. That restraint, however, might not solve every 
problem. For example, a pre-1978 transferor may desire a stepped-up basis in the 
assets transferred and thus prefer the Raich result. It would seem unduly lenient 
for the Service to permit taxpayers to elect either the Raich or the Focht approach, 
but it is far from clear that it can compel reporting in accordance with Focht. 
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the exclusive redefinition of liabilities; thus Focht is to be applied only 
to situations that are explicitly covered by the legislation. Conceivably, 
Congress could have concluded that in some stiuations the result 
reached in Raich is preferable to the result in Focht. But that conclu-
sion would surely be wrong.52 It seems more probable that Congress 
simply made the minimum change in the statutory law necessary to re-
solve the specific problem brought before it. It would be more reasonable 
for Congress to have adopted a neutral posture concerning other ap-
plications of the Focht analysis.53 It is obviously impossible, however, 
to predict with assurance whether the Focht analysis retains vitality 
outside the narrow scope of the new legislation. The suggestion here is 
that, in spite of the ensuing confusion, it should. 54 
2. Technical Defects in the Amendment 
In addition to this basic ambiguity, the draftsmanship of the new pro-
visions leaves much unresolved. The most significant ambiguity in sec-
tions 357 and 358, as amended, is the extent to which the basis of the 
stock received by the transferor is to be reduced as a consequence of the 
transferee's assumption of deductible liabilities. Under Focht, of course, 
no such reduction would ever be made because deductible liabilities 
would be ignored for all purposes of section 358. The general basis re-
duction provision is now found in section 358( d) ( 1). It requires, in 
effect, that the basis of the stock received by the transferor be reduced 
by the amount of all liabilities assumed by the transferee. New section 
358(d) (2) creates an exception to this rule for the amount of any lia-
bility "excluded under section 357 (c) ( 3) ," apparently conforming sec-
tion 358(d) with the result reached in Focht to the extent that section 
52 See text accompanying notes 27-28 supra. The Senate Report states that the 
redefinition of liabilities is not applicable to § 357 (b). See text accompanying note 
48 supra. Under that subsection, if an assumption is shown to have a tax avoidance 
purpose, then the amount of all liabilities assumed in the§ 351 exchange is excluded 
from the general rule of§ 357(a) and treated as a distribution of money. The provi-
sion is expressly punitive: all liabilities are so treated, not only those liabilities the 
assumption of which constitutes tax avoidance. See Treas. Reg. § 1.357-1 (c), T.D. 
6528, 1961-1 C.B. 81. Nevertheless, there is no indication that Congress ever in-
tended that this provision impose a greater penalty than to preclude the deferral of 
tax. See W.H.B. Simpson, 43 T.C. 900,914-15 (1965). If Focht was correctly de-
cided, it is because Raich wrongfully deprived the transferor of a deduction to 
which it was entitled and taxed it on a greater amount of gain than it realized on the 
exchange. If that result is improper under§ 357(c), it is equally improper under 
§357(b). 
53 It is particularly difficult to understand why, for example, Congress would 
wish to deprive pre-October, 1978, transferors of the protection of Focht. 
54 This suggestion assumes that§ 357(c) (3) will remain in the Code unaltered. 
The thesis herein, of course, is that the Focht-§ 357(c) (3) approach to the Raich 
problem is fraught with difficulties, and that there is a more desirable solution. 
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357 (c) ( 3) is applicable. New section 357 (c) ( 3), however, is only 
applicable for the purposes of section 357 (c) ( 1) ; that is, deductible 
liabilities are ignored only for the purpose of reducing or eliminating the 
tax that otherwise would be imposed upon the assumption of liabilities 
in excess of basis. If section 357 (c) ( 1) is not applicable to a section 351 
exchange because the total liabilities assumed do not exceed the basis 
of the transferred assets, no liabilities will have been "excluded" under 
section 357(c) (3). Literally, therefore, section 358(d) (2) would be 
inapplicable, and the basis of the transferor's stock would be reduced by 
the amount of the deductible liabilities assumed. Thus, contrary to the 
result reached in Focht, the transferor would be subject to tax in the 
future on the amount of the deductible liabilities assumed in the section 
351 exchange. 
If section 357 (c) ( 1), and thus section 357 (c) ( 3), is applicable to 
the exchange, then section 358(d) (2) will be applicable. The basis of 
the transferor's stock will not be reduced, and the transferor will never 
be subject to tax \vith respect to assumed deductible liabilities. Section 
357 (c) ( 3) will be applicable, however, even though the liabilities as-
sumed exceed basis by only one dollar. In that event, a one dollar differ-
ence in the liabilities assumed, or in the basis in the assets transferred, 
could produce an enormous difference in the tax ultimately imposed 
on the transferor. Clearly that result could not have been intended. 
The language of section 357 (c) ( 3) suggests that if it is applicable, 
all deductible liabilities are to be ignored. For purposes of sections 357 
(c) ( 1) and ( 3), it does not matter, however, whether all such liabili-
ties are ignored or only an amount sufficient to prevent the imposition 
of tax. The sharp disparity in treatment under section 358 (d) could be 
eliminated by reading section 357 (c) ( 3) as excluding only an amount 
of liabilities necessary to avoid tax under section 357 (c). But there is 
no support for such a construction in the language of section 357 (c) ( 3) 
or elsewhere. 
Regardless of the statutory ambiguity, section 358( d) (2) must be 
read broadly to prohibit in a section 351 exchange a basis reduction at-
tributable to the assumption of any liability described in new section 
357 (c) ( 3) (A) ( ii), regardless of whether section 357 (c) ( 1) is actu-
ally applicable. 55 The effect of not reducing basis pursuant to section 
358 (d) ( 1) is to achieve a permanent exemption from tax, not merely 
a deferral. To permit this exemption with respect to only certain de-
ductible liabilities-depending solely on the tax basis of the assets 
transferred in the exchange-would be absurd. The unfortunate drafts-
manship of section 358(d) (2) cannot be permitted to produce such a 
result. 
55 Section 358(d) (2) is, under this construction, applicable in one situation in 
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There are many other interpretive difficulties with the new amend-
ments.56 It is not the purpose of this Article, however, to examine the 
details of these provisions, but rather to question their desirability in 
principle. For the purpose of identifying that which is to be criticized, 
it may be concluded that the result itself in Focht has been codified (with 
a minor ambiguity as to the basis of the stock received by the trans-
feror), that the codification is narrower than the scope of the case, and 
that the continued vitality of the Focht analysis in areas not covered by 
the legislation is debatable. 
III 
INADEQUACY OF THE SOLUTION 
Aside from whatever interpretive complexities these new provisions 
create, there are two basic defects in the F ocht-section 357 (c) ( 3) solu-
tion. Both reflect the fact that the nonrecognition provisions of section 
351 were not designed to affect the taxation of ordinary business income 
which Congress would probably not have intended it to apply. If the§ 357(c) (3) 
redefinition of liabilities is exclusive, the assumption of deductible liabilities in an 
exchange to which§ 357 (b) applies would subject the transferor to tax. The trans-
feror's basis in the stock received would be increased accordingly by the amount so 
taxed. I.R.C. § 358(a) (1) (B) (ii). If its basis in the stock were not then reduced by 
the amount of the liability assumed, the transferor might be regarded as receiving a 
double tax benefit. If one accepts the argument that the imposition of tax with re-
spect to deductible liabilities is always improper, see note 52 supra, this double bene-
fit would produce a nearly correct result by extending a future tax benefit to offset 
the tax imposed. The mechanism for achieving that result would of course be rather 
contorted. However, if Congress did not intend to redefine liabilities for purposes 
of§ 357(b), it is unlikely that it would concur in this justification for the double 
benefit. 
56 For example, it may be difficult to identify allowable deductions given the 
multitude of Code sections that give, take away, and limit deductions that are al-
lowed elsewhere. Thus,§ 163(a) allows a deduction for interest, but§ 163(d) lim-
its the deductibility of investment interest as a function of certain classes of income. 
For purposes of§ 357(c) (3), is the amount of the allowable interest deduction a 
function of income earned as of the date of the§ 351 exchange, or can the amount be 
enlarged by subsequent earnings during the year? 
The proper scope of the exception in § 357 (c) ( 3) (B) is also uncertain. The 
Senate Report states that the exception would apply if a taxpayer purchased small 
tools on credit and thereafter transferred the tools and the related account payable 
in a § 351 exchange. The Report takes the position that until the payable is dis-
charged and the amount thereof deducted, the transferor has a basis in the tools. 
See SENATE REPORT, at 185 n.7. It is true that in the described situation there is no 
need for the relief extended by § 357 (c) ( 3), because the amount of the payable as-
sumed will be offset by the transferor's basis in the corresponding asset. The ex-
tension of this illustration, for example, to paperclips would create a rather unusual 
definition of basis and in effect limit the scope of the new provisions to liabilities 
incurred for services. 
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and expense and do not function properly when forced to accommodate 
those items.57 First, the solution is technically inconsistent with the 
general structure of the incorporation sections; it thus creates unneces-
sary confusion and necessitates further adjustments to the pattern of 
taxation to compensate for the inconsistency. Second, the solution as-
sumes that the assignment of income doctrine is inapplicable to incorpo-
ration exchanges; this assumption is wrong as a matter of law and ob-
jectionable as a matter of tax policy. 
A. Structural Inconsistencies 
The technical inconsistencies created by the F ocht-section 357 (c) 
( 3) solution become apparent when attention is turned from the trans-
feror to the corporate transferee. Initially, it is clear in our illustration 
that the transferee acquires a $35 basis in the transferred properties.58 
The full effect of the section 351 exchange on the transferee, however, 
depends upon the income tax consequences of its payment of the as-
sumed accounts payable, and those consequences are not clear. The un-
certainty requires a measure of explanation. 
The other side of decisions such as Crane is that the purchaser is 
treated as having paid an amount for the property equal to the sum of 
the cash actually paid plus the amount of the liabilities assumed. In our 
illustration, the purchaser paid $15 in cash, plus $40 by way of assumed 
liabilities, in exchange for property having a value of $55. From a purely 
economic perspective, it is immaterial to the purchaser whether the lia-
bilities assumed would have been deductible if paid by the seller. Func-
tionally, all of the purchaser's payments are of the purchase price for the 
property. As such, these payments are not deductible but must be cap-
italized by addition to the purchaser's cost basis in the properties ac-
quired.59 
In the absence of section 351, the transfer of property to a corpora-
tion in exchange for its stock and the assumption of liabilities would 
constitute a sale.60 Since neither the present nor prior versions of sec-
tion 351,61 nor any other provision in the Code, addresses the treatment 
of the transferee on its discharge of assumed liabilities, the courts were 
required to infer the extent to which the predecessors to section 351 had 
57 See text accompanying notes 122-24 infra. 
58 See note 38 and accompanying text supra. 
59 E.g., Magruder v. Supplee, 316 U.S. 394 (1942); Leavitt v. Commissioner, 31 
T.C.M. (CCH) 453 (1972). 
60I.R.C. § 1001(c). See Marr v. United States, 268 U.S. 536 (1925) (stock-
holder subject to tax on shares received in exchange following reincorporation in 
another state). 
61 E.g., Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 112 (b) ( 5), 53 Stat. 37; Revenue Act of 
1921, ch. 136, tit. II,§ 202(c) (3), 42 Stat. 230. 
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altered the character of the exchange for purposes other than the trans-
feror's recognition of gain. Perhaps because the reorganization provi-
sions reversed a series of early decisions by the Supreme Court,62 and 
thus were regarded as exceptions to the common-law concept of a cor-
poration, the courts declined to read the early nonrecognition provisions 
broadly. They failed to find a congressional intent that the transferee 
should be regarded as merely a continuation of the transferor and thus 
entitled to the same income tax deductions that would have been avail-
able to the transferor.63 From the perspective of the transferor, there 
may be a sufficient continuity of its investment between the unincorpo-
rated business and the transferee corporation to permit deferral of gain 
on the exchange. 64 But, from the entity perspective, the transferee should 
be regarded as wholly separate and distinct from its predecessor. The 
courts have specifically rejected the argument that the requirement of a 
carryover basis to the transferee implies the carryover of other tax at-
tributes, such as the deductibility of expenses attributable to the trans-
feror's business. 65 This principle of lack of continuity at the entity level 
remains firmly established today.66 
62 E.g., Rockefeller v. United States, 257 U.S. 176 (1921); United States v. 
Phellis, 257 U.S. 156 (1921). 
63 Holdcroft Transp. Co. v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1946) ; Mer-
chants Bank Bldg. Co. v. Helvering, 84 F.2d 478 (8th Cir. 1936). Cf. M. Buten & 
Sons v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 178, 181 (1972) (fact that expenditure 
would have been deductible if paid by partnership does not establish its deductibility 
when paid by successor corporation). 
64 This assumes that the several requirements of § 351 are met, including the 
transferor's control over the transferee as defined in§ 368(c). 
65 Holdcroft Transp. Co. v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 323, 324-25 (8th Cir. 1946). 
66 See Dearborn Gage Co., 48 T.C. 190 (1967) ; Ezo Products Co., 37 T.C. 385 
(1961); Treas. Reg.§ 1.312-ll(a), T.D. 6476, 1960-2 C.B. 113; Rev. Rul. 56-256, 
1956-1 C.B. 129. See also Nash v. United States, 398 U.S. 1 (1970). In Nash, the 
Court held that an accrual method transferor was not required to restore the 
amount of its bad debt reserve to income. Consistent with the principle of discon-
tinuity, the Court concluded that in the exchange the transferor received no more 
than the net value of the receivables. 
It is beyond the scope of this A1·ticle to reexamine the principle of discontinuity; 
however, the decisions cited above are undoubtedly correct. Section 351 is the 
broadest of the Code's nonrecognition provisions. It may apply to the transfer of a 
single item of property, to the simultaneous transfer of several previously unre-
lated items, or to the incorporation of an entire ongoing business. Although it might 
be appropriate to find continuity if an entire business were transferred in a section 
351 exchange, it is clearly tnappropriate to permit the shifting of deductions to the 
transferee merely because it has assumed liabilities in connection with the transfer 
of a minor item of property. In the absence of a statutory basis for discriminating 
among diverse transactions, the courts have found it necessary to apply a blanket 
rule of discontinuity. 
Even if an entire business were incorporated, it might still be undesirable to find 
continuity between one or more individual transferors and the corporation. The 
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Prior to the adoption of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, it was 
unclear whether, even in a statutory merger or other acquisitive reor-
ganization, the transferee could carry over the transferor's items of in-
come and expense and deduct the payment of assumed liabilities.67 
However, since nonrecognition is extended only to reorganizations in 
which there is substantial business continuity,68 Congress deemed it ap-
propriate to permit the transferee to "step into the 'tax shoes' of its 
predecessor" in such circumstances.69 Accordingly, section 381 was 
added by the 1954 Code to require the transferee to "succeed to and 
take into account" certain enumerated items of the transferor. Section 
381 (c) ( 16) specifically provides for liabilities assumed by the trans-
feree that would have been deductible if paid by the transferor: such 
liabilities are deductible by the transferee upon their discharge. 
Section 381, however, is applicable only to those reorganization ex-
changes in which substantially all of the properties of a corporation are 
transferred to a second corporation; it is not applicable to section 351 
exchanges. 70 Since the transferor in a section 351 exchange need not be 
a corporation and need not transfer either its entire business or a major 
portion thereof, continuity at the entity level was evidently regarded as 
insufficient to permit the carryover of these items. Although the Com-
mittee Reports to the 1954 legislation observed that no inferences were 
to be drawn from the adoption of section 381 with respect to transactions 
not subject to the new provision,71 Congress clearly intended no change 
in existing law with regard to section 351. Existing law prohibited de-
duction of assumed liabilities by the transferee. At the very least, the 
adoption of section 381 indicated that Congress regarded treatment of 
the transferee as a mere continuation of its predecessor as less appro-
priate in a section 351 exchange than in the reorganizations specified 
in the new section. 
Thus, under the decided case law, supported both by principle and by 
income distorting effect of transactions between an individual and a corporation, 
particularly the shifting of items of income and expense, is substantial. Indeed, sev-
eral provisions of the Code specifically address the tax avoidance potential of such 
transactions. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 179(d) (2), 267(b) (2), 1235(d) (1), 1239(b) (2). 
67 H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 41, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CoDE 
CoNG. & AD. NEws 4017, 4066--67; see VCA Corp. v. United States, [1977] FED. 
TAXES INC. (P-H) (40 A.F.T.R.2d) ~ 77-5113 (Ct. a. trial judge's opinion). 
68 See I.R.C. § 368(a) (1). 
69 H.R. REP. No. 1337, supra note 67, at 41, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CoDE CoNG. 
& AD. NEWS at 4067. 
70 I.R.C. § 381 (a). Even in the specified situations, application of § 381 can be 
troublesome. See VCA Corp. v. United States, [1977] FED. TAXES INC. (P-H) 
( 40 A.F.T.R.2d) ~ 77-5113 (Ct. Cl. trial judge's opinion). 
71 H.R. REP. No. 1337, supra note 67, at A135, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CoDE 
CoNG. & AD. NEws at 4273. 
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the legislative history of the reorganization provisions, the transferee 
is not entitled to a deduction for its discharge of assumed accounts pay-
able. It does not follow, however, that the corporation must capitalize 
these payments and add their amount to the tax basis of the acquired 
properties. In fact, at least in those circumstances in which the trans-
feror would not have been able to deduct its payment of the liability, it is 
clear that the transferee may not capitalize the payment. If the trans-
feree were permitted to do so, its basis would consist of a carryover 
basis under section 362 plus the cost basis attributable to the liabilities. 
This result would be clearly improper. 72 
72 The effect of permitting such an adjustment to basis can be seen by reference 
to the illustration of the Raich case in which we assumed that the liabilities either 
were attributable to a borrowing by the transferor or were the previously deducted 
accounts payable of an accrual method transferor. See text accompanying notes 29-
32 supra. The corporate transferee acquired a basis of $40 in the transferred prop-
erties (a carryover basis of $35 pi us the $5 recognized gain) and assumed liabilities 
of $40. The $40 basis properly left the transferee with a gain of $15 inherent in its 
properties, which had a value of $55. If the $40 basis were increased by the amount 
of the assumed liabilities, the resulting $80 basis would create a $25 unrealized loss 
in the properties, a nonsensical result. 
To permit the transferee in a § 351 exchange to capitalize the amount of ac-
counts payable that would have been deductible if paid by the transferor mitigates 
the harshness of disallowing all tax benefit, but it does so in an irrational manner. 
It is not clear whether the resulting increase in basis would be allocated among the 
acquired properties by a ratio of the relative values, relative tax bases, or relative 
amounts of appreciation. It is clear, however, that for given face amounts of ac-
counts payable and receivable, changes in the quantity or character of the other 
properties contributed to the corporation affect the amount currently taxable to 
the transferee corporation. For example, assume an allocation on a ratio of the 
relative values of the contributed properties. A greater value of contributed fixed 
assets will result in a larger proportion of basis adjustment allocated to those as-
sets; this will result in a greater income from collection of accounts receivable 
that will be currently taxable to the corporation. 
In any context requiring the allocation of basis, the basis allocated to any given 
asset will be partly a function of the value or some other characteristic of the 
other assets involved. In the allocation formula, the presence of capital assets will 
affect the amount of ordinary income taxed to the transferee. Nevertheless, it is 
extraordinary, perhaps unique, for a basis allocation to affect the amount of current 
ordinary income that will be subject to tax. In a taxable purchase of assets, for ex-
ample, the same allocation of basis must be made. Also, however, the seller will be 
required to allocate the purchase price received, and this allocation should corre-
spond to the purchaser's allocation. Thus, the seller will be subject to a current 
ordinary income tax with respect to the transferred accounts receivable to exactly 
the same extent that the purchaser is relieved of tax through the basis allocation. 
Between the buyer and seller, the full amount of the accounts receivable will be 
subject to a current tax. In contrast, under Focht the transferor would be entirely 
relieved of any current tax. Thus, as between the transferor and the transferee in 
a§ 351 exchange, the amount of ordinary business income earned in the year of the 
exchange that would be subject to current tax is indeterminate and would vary 
with the character of the fixed assets transferred. To say the least, this result is 
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From the perspective of the transferee, the nature of the assumed 
liability in the hands of the transferor is irrelevant. Except by premising 
continuity at the entity level and according tax relief to the transferee 
solely because that relief had been denied to the transferor, it is impos-
sible to distinguish between assumed accounts payable of a cash method 
transferor and any other liability assumed by a transferee in a section 
351 exchange. Since such continuity does not exist, there is no basis for 
a different treatment of deductible liabilities. Accordingly, the transferee 
may neither deduct the amount of assumed accounts payable nor add that 
amount to the basis of the acquired properties. As a result, under a con-
sistent and principled construction of the tax law, the transferee is en-
titled to no tax benefit with respect to the payment of such amounts. 
Under the Raich decision, this result might have appeared acceptable. 
The transferor in our illustration was left with stock having a basis of 
zero and a value of $15 and thus was allowed to defer a gain of $15. The 
transferee acquired property having a basis of $40 and a value of $55 
and thus was left in the same tax position as the transferor. Although 
neither party would ever obtain a tax benefit from the discharge of the 
accounts payable, the symmetrical treatment of the parties provided the 
appearance that the Code had operated correctly. But under the treat-
ment of the transferor prescribed in Focht, the denial of all tax benefit 
to the transferee plainly produces an unsatisfactory result. In our illus-
tration of the effect of that decision, the transferor was not subject to any 
tax on the exchange. The transferor had received stock with a basis of 
$35 and a value of $15 and thus was allowed to defer a net loss of 
$20. The transferee acquired a carryover basis of $35 in properties hav-
ing a value of $55. If the transferee were denied all tax benefit attrib-
utable to discharge of the accounts payable, the transferee would be 
fully subject to ta.x on the collection of the accounts receivable, with no 
offsetting benefit. The tax position of the transferee would not reflect 
the position of the transferor; indeed, on these facts, the corporation 
would be placed in a gain, instead of a loss, position. Since this harsh 
result is not dictated by section 351 's purpose of nonrecognition, it must 
be rejected as inconsistent with that section's policy of facilitating the 
incorporation of businesses. 
In practice, however, even prior to Raich, the transferee corporation 
rather odd. 
Permitting the transferee corporation to deduct payment of assumed liabiilties 
eliminates this random impact of the assumption of indebtedness. Since there would 
be no increase in basis to be allocated, the entire amount of the accounts receivable 
would be subject to a current tax. Thus, items of current income and expense 
would be fully taken into account for income tax purposes. Accordingly, if a tax 
benefit were to be extended to the transferee with respect to accounts payable, an 
immediate deduction would be far preferable to capitalization. 
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was able to avoid this result because the Internal Revenue Service, as a 
matter of policy, had permitted the corporate transferee to deduct its 
payment of assumed liabilities.73 The Service did not adopt this policy 
in disagreement with the principles outlined above. Rather, the Service 
had made the correlative decision to abandon application of the assign-
ment of income doctrine to incorporation exchanges. This resulted in 
taxing the transferee, rather than the transferor, on the assigned ac-
counts receivable.74 Since it would have been improper to tax the trans-
feree on the collection of the receivables without granting offsetting re-
lief for the discharge of the payables, the deduction was permitted. In 
effect, deviation from one basic principle of taxation, the assignment of 
income doctrine, c~mpelled deviation from another, that no corporate 
transferee is entitled to a tax benefit for the payment of the transferor's 
obligations. Although unsatisfying in the abstract, this series of com-
promises at least leaves the transferee under the Focht approach in the 
correct tax position: the $40 deduction offsets the $20 of income from 
accounts receivable and produces a $20 tax loss. The position of the 
transferee thus mirrors the position of the transferor. 
Nevertheless, the result is unsatisfactory. There is a great advantage 
in the consistent and uniform application of those general and guiding 
principles that form the basic structure of our tax laws. Individual Code 
sections are far more readily understandable if they prescribe conse-
quences that are consistent with expectations aroused by these princi-
ples. Conversely, ad hoc exceptions to the Code's general scheme 
create complexity, obscurity, and, in their wake, taxpayer error. Such 
deviations should be avoided unless a compelling policy clearly requires 
otherwise. Accordingly, although the Service's position produces an ac-
ceptable consequence for the transferee, it does not result in a satisfac-
tory pattern of taxation.75 
This objection to the Service's policy would stand even if it had the 
clear force of law; here, however, the deviation from principle not only 
lacks statutory authority but also conflicts with existing case law. More-
over, there is some recent indication from the Tax Court that it disagrees 
with the Service's policy. The Tax Court in Focht was apparently aware 
that its treatment of the transferor created serious problems as to the 
proper treatment of the transferee. But that issue was not before it, and 
73 Points to Remember, TAx LAW., Apr. 1965, at 114. See Hempt Bros. v. 
United States, 354 F. Supp. 1172, 1179 n.l6 (M.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 490 F.Zd 1172 
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 826 (1974). 
74 See text accompanying note 109 infra. 
75 The pattern of taxation produced is not only unacceptable with respect to the 
transferee, but also, because of the failure to apply the assignment of income doc-
trine, the pattern is unsatisfactory with respect to the transferor. See text accom-
panying note 79 infra. 
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the majority specifically declined to comment on the corporation's en-
titlement to a deduction.76 Somewhat cryptically, however, the court 
cited Magruder v. Supplee,71 a case in which the Supreme Court re-
fused to allow the transferee in a taxable transaction a deduction for its 
discharge of assumed liabilities, although the liabilities would have been 
deductible if paid by the transferor. The Tax Court was evidently sug-
gesting that the position of the transferee in a section 351 exchange is 
indistinguishable from the position of the transferee in a taxable ex-
change; thus, such deductions are not allowable in either context. 
It is not clear to what extent the drafters of section 357 (c) ( 3) con-
sidered the tax position of the transferee. The Senate Report accom-
panying the amendment states that "the provision is not intended to 
affect the corporate-transferees' tax accounting for the excluded liabili-
ties."78 Given the ambiguities of present law, the most reasonable con-
struction of this statement is that Congress simply declined to examine 
the position of the transferee. In any event, the Report clearly does not 
disapprove ofF ocht' s reservation of this issue. 
Thus, it appears probable that when the issue is presented the courts 
will reject the Service's policy of allowing the transferee a deduction for 
the discharge of obligations assumed in a section 351 exchange. Should 
they do so, an unacceptably large tax burden will be imposed on the 
transferee, and the Focht solution will fail. 
B. Failure to Apply the Assignment of Income Doctrine 
The objection to the F ocht-section 357 (c) ( 3) solution, however, is 
more basic than either its inability to treat the transferee in a principled 
and reasonable manner or its creation of future interpretive difficulties. 
The accounts receivable represent ordinary business income, which has 
been earned completely through the efforts of the transferor. The benefit 
that produced the accounts payable has been received entirely by the 
transferor in the form of purchased goods or services. Clearly, it does 
not accurately reflect the income of the transferor to omit these 
amounts, nor does it accurately reflect the income of the transferee, 
who neither earned the income nor incurred the expense, to include 
these amounts either in whole or in part.79 If the transferor were re-
quired in its final income tax return to accrue and pay tax on these 
amounts, the incomes of both the transferor and the transferee would 
be more accurately reflected. This accrual would be compelled if the 
76 68 T.C. at 238. 
77 316 U.S. 394 (1942). 
78 SENATE REPORT, supra note 46, at 185. 
79 If the transferee were allowed a deduction upon its discharge of the assumed 
obligations, the transferred accounts receivable would be only partly reflected in 
the transferee's income. 
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assignment of income principles that are generally applied through-
out the Code were applied to section 351 exchanges. If the assign-
ment doctrine were applied, the Raich problem of the cash method 
transferor would simply disappear.80 Stated differently, the Raich 
problem is merely the result of failing to apply the generally applicable 
assignment of income principles to section 351 exchanges. The proper 
solution must come from a reversal of that omission. Therefore, aside 
from the technical difficulties it creates, the F ocht-section 357 (c) ( 3) 
solution is objectionable because it assumes that the assignment of in-
come doctrine will not be applied to incorporation transfers.81 
Requiring the transferor to accrue all current items would have the 
following effect on our illustration. In the final income tax return of the 
unincorporated business, the transferor would be subject to tax on the 
accounts receivable and would be permitted a deduction for the accounts 
payable, producing a net deduction of $20.82 Having been subject to tax, 
the accounts receivable would acquire a basis equal to their face amount 
of $20.83 Thus, the basis of the properties transferred to the corporation 
would be $55 ($35 plus $20), and the $40 of liabilities to be assumed 
would not exceed that amount. Accordingly, the transferor would rec-
ognize no gain on the incorporation. The basis of the stock received 
would be the substituted basis of $55 reduced by the $40 of assumed 
liabilities, or $15. Since the amount of the accounts payable will have 
been deducted, their assumption would produce a recognized gain in a 
taxable transaction. Thus, the treatment of deductible liabilities becomes 
irrelevant; all liabilities must be taken into account under sections 357 
and 358, thereby reducing the basis of the stock received by the trans-
feror.84 Since the transferor would have reported all items of current 
so See Roha, The Application of Section 357( c) of the Internal Revenue Code to 
a Section 351 Transfer of Accounts Receivable and Payable, 24 CATH. U.L. REv. 
243, 260 (1975) (calling for a similar solution by legislative amendment of § 357). 
81 The reference herein to the assignment of income doctrine is to that body of 
tax law established by cases such as Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930). Broadly 
speaking, the doctrine requires that income be ta..'Ced to the one who earned it and 
possessed the right to receive it. The term is also used in other contexts. See note 
92 infra. 
82 The transferor is treated as if it had received cash in the amount of the lia-
bilities assumed and discharged its own obligations. See text accompanying notes 
9-11 supra. 
83 Presumably the transferor either would not be required to accrue the amount 
of worthless accounts or would be entitled to accrue an offsetting bad debt deduc-
tion under§ 166(a). See Williamson v. United States, 292 F.2d 524 (Ct. C!.1961). 
This adjustment is ignored in our illustration. 
84 New§ 357(c) (3) would presumably not apply to a transferor who was re-
quired to accrue all items of current income and expense, because the transferor 
would no longer be employing the cash method of accounting. If the suggestion 
made herein is adopted, however, then new§§ 357(c) (3) and 358(d) (2) would 
serve no purpose and should be repealed. 
82 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Volume 58, 1979] 
income and expense, no further gain or loss would be deferred in the 
basis of its stock; the stock would have a $15 value also. The transferee 
corporation would receive a carryover basis of $55 in the properties ac-
quired in the exchange, an amount equal to their value. Thus the trans-
feree would have no income upon collection of the accounts receivable. 
Since a full tax benefit would have been obtained with respect to the 
accounts payable, the actual payment of these obligations by the corpo-
rate transferee would have no further income tax consequences.85 The 
result thus obtained would be correct: the transferee and the transferor 
would be in an identical tax position, both having no gain or loss inher-
ent in their respective properties attributable to items of current income 
or expense. 86 
The difference in income tax consequences between the accrual pro-
posal above and the F ocht-section 357 (c) ( 3) approach is not the differ-
ence between deferral and immediate taxation of items of current in-
come and expense. Although under the latter approach the net amount 
85 Deduction of the liability would convert its tax status to the equivalent of a 
borrowing by the transferor; thus, assumption and payment by the transferee pro-
duces neither a deduction nor an adjustment to basis. Just as the transferor may be 
regarded as having received cash constituting a return of capital, rather than a real-
ization of gain, so the transferee may be regarded as having borrowed the cash and 
as having delivered it to the transferor. If the transferee were to convert $40 of its 
properties to cash, at no gain or loss, and discharge the accounts payable, it would 
possess property having a tax basis and value of $15. The transferee's position 
would thus mirror the position of the transferor. 
86 The assignment of income doctrine could, of course, impose a tax on the 
transferor of accounts receivable even if the liabilities assumed by the transferee 
did not exceed the basis of the assets transferred. If the transferred deductible lia-
bilities exceeded the accounts receivable, then the transferor would be entitled to a 
net deduction. In the reverse position, the transferor would be subject to tax. Fur-
ther, if the total of the liabilities assumed, deductible or not, exceeded the tax basis 
of the assets transferred, then the excess would also be subject to tax under § 
357 (c). The tax basis of those assets, however, would first be increased by the 
amount of the accounts receivable subject to tax under the assignment of income 
doctrine. Thus, if in the example in the text the $40 liability were attributable to a 
borrowing, then under either the Raich or the Focht approach the transferor would 
be subject to tax on $5 pursuant to § 357 (c) and would receive a basis of zero in 
stock worth $15, thus deferring an additional tax on $15. If the assignment of in-
come doctrine were applied, the transferor would be subject to an immediate tax 
on the $20 of receivables, producing a total basis of $55. Since the liabilities as-
sumed would no longer exceed the basis of the assets transferred, no further tax 
would be imposed under§ 357 (c). The transferor would have a basis of $15 in stock 
having the same value. If the liability assumed were $60 and the equipment had a 
value in excess of its tax basis, the transferor would be subject to tax under the 
assignment of income doctrine on the $20 of accounts receivable and, under § 
357 (c), on the $5 excess of the liabilities assumed over the $55 basis of the assets 
transferred. The transferor's basis in the stock received would be zero, deferring 
tax on any gain inherent in the equipment in excess of the $5 already taxed under 
§357(c). 
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of such items would produce a deferred tax consequence to the trans-
feror, the transferee corporation would be subject to a current tax on all 
such items. The significant distinction between these approaches is that 
under the accrual approach the transferor, not the transferee, is subject 
to current tax.87 The accrual approach also, of course, eliminates the 
interpretive complexities introduced by section 357 (c) ( 3), particularly 
the need to redefine the term liabilities for purposes of the incorporation 
provisions of the Code. Furthermore, it obviates the need to grant the 
corporate transferee a deduction of dubious validity for the discharge 
of another's obligations. 
IV 
EFFECT oF AccouNTING METHODS 
Before examining the suggestion that the transferor should be re-
quired to include accounts receivable in income under assignment of in-
come principles, it will be useful to put a preliminary argument to rest. 
Although the Raich problem is obviously attributable to the transferor's 
use of the cash method of accounting, the use of that method was en-
tirely proper. One possible objection to the accrual approach sug-
gested above is that under the cash method the accounts receivable 
do not themselves constitute taxable income to the unincorporated busi-
ness and do not produce taxable income until after their transfer to the 
corporation, at which time the income is that of the corporate trans-
feree.88 This objection, however, misapprehends the function of an ac-
counting method. 
Income, regardless of how defined, is taxed under our system with 
respect to a period of time.89 Unless items of income and expense can be 
assigned with relative accuracy to a particular period, taxpayers will be 
able to marshal their receipts and expenditures in a manner that could 
substantially reduce their burden of taxation.90 A method of accounting 
is merely a set of rules used to assign items of income and expense to a 
particular period of time. The rules are fashioned solely to resolve ques-
87 The accrual approach also eliminates a second, albeit deferred, tax to the 
transferor on current items. This elimination is theoretically preferable but is of 
little practical importance. 
88 See, e.g., Palmer v. Commissioner, 267 F.Zd 434, 437 (9th Cir. 1959) (tax-
payer's argument); Dauber, Accounts Receivable in Section 351 Transactions, 52 
A.B.A.]. 92 (1966). 
89 I.R.C. § 441. A transactional approach is permitted for certain long-term con-
tracts. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-3, T.D. 7397, 1976-1 C.B. 115. 
90 The incentive for such activities is provided primarily by the progressive tax 
rate structure and by various Code provisions that limit the deduction of certain 
expenditures as a function of income. See, e.g., I.RC. §§ 163(d), 170(b), 172(d) 
(4), 613(a), 1211. 
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tions of timing ; the use of an accounting method for any other purpose 
is improper.91 In particular, an accounting method should not be used 
to select the taxable person with respect to an item of income, because 
the method assumes the prior determination of that person. According-
ly, in a section 351 exchange, the transferor's choice of accounting meth-
od should not determine who is to report the items of income and ex-
pense represented by the accounts receivable and payable. In other 
words, the Focht result, which allows the transferor to forego a current 
tax on income and taxes the transferee instead, cannot be justified by 
the transferor's use of the cash method of accounting. 
v 
THE AssiGNMENT oF INco~rE DocTRINE 
In order to protect the integrity of the tax rate structure, with its 
progressive impact and distinction between ordinary income and capital 
gains, the courts have evolved a series of loosely related principles that 
in the aggregate are somewhat confusingly referred to as the assign-
ment of income doctrine. In this Article, the expression is used in its 
primary sense, namely, that income should be taxed to the one who 
earned it and not to the one who merely receives the payment.92 In ad-
dition to these judicially developed principles, there are some provisions 
in the Code that in application parallel the assignment of income doc-
trine in some of its permutations.93 
91 See Hempt Bros. v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1172, 1176 (M.D. Pa. 1973); 
Jud Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1946). 
" 'Ascertainment of income' is chiefly a matter of accounting. 'Allocation of in-
come' is chiefly a matter of the application of income tax law to basic legal rights. 
The terms are not synonymous." !d. at 685. See also Williamson v. United States, 
292 F.2d 524, 530 (Ct. Cl. 1961). 
92 The doctrine applies to income earned either through the performance of 
services, Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930), or through the employment of capital, 
Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940). When the taxpayer sells the right tore-
ceive income, instead of giving the right away, the doctrine does not normally ap-
ply, because the seller will be subject to tax on the proceeds of the sale. When 
a seller has contended that the rights sold constituted a capital asset, however, the 
courts have resorted to the assignment of income doctrine to deny capital gains 
treatment. Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958). The issue pre-
sented in Earl and Horst was the selection of the appropriate person to tax ; the 
issue presented in P.G. Lake was the definition of a capital asset. Nonrecognition 
under§ 351 may properly extend to the transfer of the type of property involved in 
P.G. Lake, although such a transfer is sometimes referred to as an assignment of 
income. See E.l. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 471 F.2d 1211 (Ct. 
Cl. 1973); H.B. Zachry Co., 49 T.C. 73,80 n.5 (1967). 
93 These Code provisions are allied to the tax accounting rules. Section 446 is of 
particular interest here. If the Commissioner determines that a taxpayer's normal 
method of accounting does not clearly reflect income, then the Commissioner is 
Liabilities in Excess of Basis 85 
Regardless of which of these manifestations of the doctrine is applied, 
the specific issue presented is whether the transferor or the transferee 
should be taxed with respect to receivables earned and payables in-
curred by the transferor prior to the section 351 exchange but respec-
tively collected and paid by the transferee. If this question were pre-
sented outside the context of section 351, the answer would be clear: 
income is taxed to the one whose services or capital produced the right 
to receive it. Thus, the question is whether section 351 overrides this 
general principle of taxation. 
A. Application to Section 351 Exchanges 
The history of the relationship between the predecessors to section 
351 and the assignment of income doctrine is a curious one. In the early 
cases, the courts had no difficulty concluding that the assignment of in-
come doctrine as evolved by the Supreme Court in Lucas v. Earl,94 H el-
vering v. H orst,95 and H elvering v. Eubank96 could be applied consis-
tently with the predecessors to section 351 to tax the transferor of ac-
counts receivable.97 The early cases, however, did not involve accounts 
receivable generated in the ordinary course of business that were trans-
ferred absent a transparent tax avoidance scheme upon the incorpora-
tion of the business. In Thomas W. Briggs,98 the first case to present 
that pattern, the government's attempt to tax the cash method trans-
feror failed. The decision in Briggs, however, was considerably clouded 
by the manner in which the issue arose. The government first argued 
that in fact the taxpayer employed an accrual method of accounting. Its 
alternative theory, based on the predecessors to sections 446 and 482, 
rather than on the doctrine of Lucas v. Earl, was that the taxpayer must 
authorized to change the taxpayer to a method that does. I.R.C. § 446(b). If a 
method of accounting does not clearly reflect income, because income earned by the 
taxpayer would be taxed to another, such as the transferee in a§ 351 exchange, then 
the considerations warranting the application of § 446 would be identical to those 
underlying the assignment of income doctrine. In addition, § 482 authorizes the 
Commissioner to allocate items of income and expense among taxpayers under 
common control so as to reflect clearly their respective incomes. See note 102 and 
accompanying text infra. 
94 281 U.S. 111 (1930). 
95311 U.S.112 (1940). 
96311 U.S.122 (1940). 
97 Thus, in Brown v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1940), aff'g 40 
B.T.A. 565 (1939), the court specifically noted that§ 351's predecessor had no ef-
fect on its conclusion that a lawyer was subject to tax on a claim for fees that he had 
transferred in return for stock in his wholly owned corporation. The court reasoned 
that the Commissioner was not taxing gain on the transfer of property but rather 
was taxing ordinary business income to the one who had earned it. !d. at 340. See 
also Clinton Davidson, 43 B.T.A. 576 (1941). 
9815 T.C.M. (CCH) 440 (1956). 
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accrue the amount of accounts receivable transferred to the corporation. 
The court, after a detailed review of the facts, rejected the government's 
primary argument and then summarily rejected its alternative theory.ll9 
Briggs might best be viewed as aberrational. Shortly thereafter, in 
Alden C. Palmer,100 the Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's authori-
ty under the predecessor to section 446 to change the transferor's meth-
od of accounting in a section 351 exchange. In Palmer, both the trans-
feror and transferee had used the completed contract method of account-
ing for construction contracts. This method allows the taxpayer to post-
pone recognition of income and expense attributable to a contract until 
its completion.l01 In its income tax return for the year of the exchange, 
the transferee in Palmer included the entire amount of profit on con-
tracts yet to be completed on the date of the transfer. Pursuant to the 
predecessor to section 446, the Commissioner required the transferor 
to change to the percentage-of-completion method. The court sustained 
this change. The effect of this decision was to tax the transferor on in-
come that was neither reportable under its normal method of accounting 
nor actually received by it; in this respect, the taxpayer was precisely 
in the position of a cash method transferor of accounts receivable. Mean-
while, another series of cases established that the Commissioner's au-
thority under section 482 and its predecessor prevailed over section 351 
and allowed the Commissioner to reallocate items of income and expense 
in order to reflect income clearly .102 
Thus, by 1962 the application of assignment of income principles to 
exchanges under section 351 appeared to be well established.103 In that 
year, however, the Tax Court decided Arthur L. Kniffen104 and again 
held that a cash method transferor in a section 351 exchange would not 
be taxed on transferred accounts receivable. The transferor in Kniffen 
was in the business of renting real property. He exchanged his proper-
99 !d. at 45(}...51. Further, these issues were only two of a very large number of 
disputes between the parties that the court addressed. 
10029 T.C. 154 (1957), aff'd on other grounds, 267 F.Zd 434 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 361 U.S. 821 (1959). 
101See Treas. Reg.§ 1.451-3(d), T.D. 7397, 1976--1 C.B. 117. 
102 See, e.g., Rooney v. United States, 305 F.Zd 681 (9th Cir. 1962) ; cf. J ud 
Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Commissioner, 153 F.Zd 681 (5th Cir. 1946) (prede-
cessor to § 482 applied upon liquidation of corporation). 
103 Cases such as Orange Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 
1942), and P.A. Birren & Son v. Commissioner, 116 F.Zd 718 (7th Cir. 1940), are 
not inconsistent with this conclusion, although the courts held the transferee tax-
able on assigned accounts receivable. In these cases, the government sought suc-
cessfully to tax the transferee on the theory that the receivables were subject to § 
351 and acquired a carryover basis in the hands of the transferee. The courts did 
not address the assignment of income question. 
104 39 T.C. 553 (1962). As in Briggs, assignment of income was not the princi-
pal issue in controversy. See note 99 supra. 
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ties and other assets for stock and the transferee's agreement to assume 
liabilities in excess of the basis of the assets transferred. The transferor 
had originally reported his income in accordance with assignment of 
income principles. In a claim for refund, he raised the issue concerning 
taxation of the accounts receivable.105 The government's theory was ap-
parently that the exchange of receivables for stock in the transferee con-
stituted an assignment of income, which subjected the transferor to tax 
upon receipt of the stock.106 This argument hopelessly confuses the 
problem of conversion of ordinary income into capital gain by the mere 
sale of the right to receive income, which is barred by one aspect of the 
assignment of income doctrine, 107 with the problem of selecting the ap-
propriate taxable person. The court seemed to accept the assignment of 
income analysis, but nevertheless held that the receipt of stock in a sec-
tion 351 exchange was not subject to tax.108 
Although Kniffen cannot reasonably be construed as a rejection of 
the assignment of income doctrine in the context of a section 351 trans-
action, shortly thereafter the Internal Revenue Service reversed its 
policy in this area. In 1965, it was reported that the Service would issue 
private rulings to the effect that the transferee, not the transferor, would 
be taxed on those accounts receivable that were transferred by a cash 
method taxpayer in a section 351 exchange109 and, moreover, that the 
transferee would be allowed a deduction with respect to the discharge of 
assumed accounts payable. Evidently this policy continues to the present 
time. 110 
105 The receivable in question was accrued interest on certain notes and deeds of 
trust. Although no interest was collected prior to the transfer, the taxpayer never-
theless reported the entire amount of accrued interest in his income tax return for 
the year of the transfer. 39 T.C. at 563-64. 
106 "The [Commissioner] contends that . . . [the transferor] nevertheless col-
lected this interest from [the transferee] ... upon the receipt ... of stock 
••.. " I d. at 564. 
107 See Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958); note 92 supra. 
108 One of the transferred receivables arose in circumstances substantially iden-
tical to the receivable that was taxed to the transferor in Brown v. Commissioner, 
115 F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1940). The Kniffen court reached the contrary result without 
reference to the earlier case. 39 T.C. at 565-66. See note 97 supra. 
109 Points to Remember, TAx. LAW., Apr. 1965, at 114. 
110 Cf. Hempt Bros. v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1172, 1179 n.l6 (M.D. Pa. 
1973), afl'd, 490 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 826 (1974) (Commis-
sioner would allow deduction for discharge of assumed accounts payable provided 
transferee entered into closing agreement to report income from transferred ac-
counts receivable). Prior to the 1965 announcement, inconsistency, or at least un-
certainty, apparently marked the Service's position. In 1962, one commentator re-
ported that "for many years" the Service had ruled that the transferred accounts 
receivable and payable were to be included in the income of the transferee, but that 
a change in policy was being considered. Hickman, Incorporation and Capitaliza-
tion, 40 TAXES 974, 978 ( 1962). Four years later, another commentator reported 
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Strangely, in the same year that this change in policy was reported, 
the Tax Court indicated in Adolph W einberg111 that it might indeed be 
willing to apply assignment of income principles to a section 351 ex-
change. The transferor in Weinberg was a cash method farmer who had 
deducted expenses attributable to growing crops that he claimed to 
have transferred in exchange for stock pursuant to section 351. The 
court held that the assignment was only of the proceeds from the sale of 
the harvested crop, and that it was ineffective to shift the incidence of 
taxation. As an alternative ground for its decision, however, the court 
said that, under assignment of income principles, the proceeds of sale 
would be taxable to the transferor because he had earned the income.112 
The most recent attempt to apply the assignment of income doctrine 
evidences the change of the Service's policy. In H entpt Brothers v. 
United States, 113 it was no longer the transferor in a section 351 ex-
change whom the government sought to tax, but rather the transferee. In 
a lengthy opinion, which reviewed much of the available authority, the 
district court sustained the Commissioner's position that the income de-
rived from the transferred accounts receivable was properly taxable to 
the corporate transferee. On appeal to the Third Circuit, the decision 
was affirmed. Because of the rearrangement of the parties on the issue, it 
is not completely clear for what proposition the case stands. Indeed, one 
of the grounds specified for the lower court's holding was that the Com-
missioner's position was a proper exercise of his discretion under sec-
tion 446_114 It seems probable that a contrary position by the govern-
ment would have been sustained as in prior cases; in fact, the district 
court stated that even in the context of a section 351 exchange, the Com-
missioner was empowered under the assignment of income doctrine and 
section 482 to prevent the distortion of income or the avoidance of tax.115 
that "for at least a decade" the Service had insisted upon taxing such items to the 
transferor, but that a change in policy was contemplated. Dauber, supra note 88, 
at 92. 
Evidently such a ruling can be obtained even if the primary reason for incorpo-
ration is the transferor's desire to have the income from an extraordinarily large 
account receivable taxed at the lower corporate rate, the classic case in another 
context for application of the assignment of income doctrine. There may be a limit, 
however, on the extent to which the Service will ratify a distortion of the transfer-
or's income. See Hempt Bros. v. United States, 490 F.2d at 1178 n.9. Cf. I.R.C. § 
357(b) (denying§ 357(a) treatment when liabilities are assumed for a tax avoid-
ance purpose) . 
11144 T.C. 233 (1965), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Commissioner v. Sugar Dad-
dy, Inc., 386 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 929 (1968). 
112 44 T.C. at 244-45. 
113 354 F. Supp. 1172 (M.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 490 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 419 U.S. 826 (1974). 
114 354 F. Supp. at 1181. 
115 I d. at 1180. 
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The appellate court seemed to agree, at least in part.116 Thus, rejection 
of the assignment of income doctrine when urged by the taxpayer does 
not entail its rejection when asserted by the Commissioner. 
Thus, as to selecting the appropriate taxable person, the case law con-
cerning the relationship between the assignment of income doctrine and 
section 351 is ambiguous. The majority of decided cases supports appli-
cation of the doctrine, but those cases most nearly resembling Raich and 
Focht reject it. In those cases rejecting the doctrine, however, the 
grounds which have been set forth for the decision have been defective. 
On balance, it seems that these authorities would support a renewed 
effort by the Service to require the transferor in a section 351 exchange 
to accrue all untaxed items of income and expense. At least they do not 
preclude such an approach.117 Regardless of the state of the case law, it 
is necessary to take a fresh look at whether the assignment of income 
doctrine is inconsistent with the policy of section 351. 
B. Consistency with the Objective of Section 351 
Upon the incorporation of a profitable business, the amount of trans-
ferred receivables will commonly exceed the amount of transferred pay-
abies. Thus, the accrual requirement is likely to result in the recognition 
of income by the transferor upon incorporation. The authorities that 
have rejected the assignment of income doctrine in this context have as-
serted that this recognition is inconsistent with the underlying purpose 
of section 351.118 The general purpose of section 351, to facilitate the in-
corporation of businesses through tax relief, is apparent.119 But that 
generality, not elaborated in the legislative history, adds little to the res-
olution of the alleged conflict. In a long series of administrative and judi-
cial constructions of the relatively brief language of section 351, it has 
116 490 F.2d at 1178 n.9. The court of appeals affirmed on grow1ds similar to the 
Tax Court's reasoning in Kniffen. Although the court of appeals referred to both 
the Earl and Lake cases, it treated the question as a conflict between Lake and § 
351 and concluded that the policy of nonrecognition should prevail. 490 F.Zd at 
1176--78. 
117 See Biblin, Assignments of Income in Comtection with Incorporating and 
Liquidating Corporations, 21 S. CAL. TAx lNST. 383 (1969). See also Nash v. 
United States, 398 U.S. 1 (1970) (discussed in note 66 supra). The effect of the 
decision in Nash was to tax the transferor in his final return on an amount approxi-
mating as closely as possible the amount upon which he would have been taxed if 
the § 351 exchange had not occurred. The assignment of income doctrine seeks the 
same result. 
118 Kahn & Oesterle, supra note 6, at 476--77; Weiss, Problems i1t the Tax-Free 
Incorporation of a Business, 41 IND. L.J. 666, 681 (1966). See also Hempt Bros. v. 
United States, 354 F. Supp. at 1177-78; Arthur L. Kniffen, 39 T.C. at 564--66. 
119 H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1921), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 
(pt. 2) 168, 175-76. 
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become entirely clear that the tax relief extended by Congress was of a 
defined and limited type. Numerous income tax consequences flow from 
the incorporation of a business, many of which are adverse to the trans-
feror. Yet relief from such consequences has been denied when it ap-
peared to exceed the dispensation granted by Congress.120 
Absent section 351, an exchange of property for stock would consti-
tute a taxable event. The appreciation in value of the properties trans-
ferred would be subject to tax. But since after the exchange the trans-
feror's investment in the transferred properties would be represented 
solely by corporate securities, its ability to consume or to pay tax has 
not been enhanced. If it nevertheless were subject to tax, it would need 
to obtain funds through partial liquidation of its investment. The result 
would be a significant contraction of the incorporated business. The 
purpose of section 351 is to alleviate the adverse income tax conse-
quences of such an incorporation by waiving the technical realization of 
gain.121 Therefore, it is deemed that at the time of the transfer a non-
taxable change in the ownership of the business properties occurs. 
Nothing in the purpose of section 351, however, concerns the ordi-
nary income and expense of the business being incorporated. Since such 
items will be converted into cash within a relatively brief time following 
the section 351 exchange, the payment of tax on this income would not 
require the contraction of the transferred business. Thus, the imposition 
of tax with respect to accounts receivable and payable would not impede 
the incorporation of businesses. 
More importantly, the "gain" inherent in accounts receivable differs 
fundamentally from the gain inherent in fixed assets. The disposition of a 
cash method taxpayer's accounts receivable does not technically amount 
to a realization in the same sense as does the disposition of appreciated 
fixed assets.122 The receipt of the receivable is a realization of income 
that could be taxed at that time. For accrual method ta..xpayers, this re-
1:!0 See, e.g., Dearborn Gage Co., 48 T.C. 190 (1967) ; Ezo Products Co., 37 
T.C. 385,393---94 (1961) (loss of§ 481 adjustment upon incorporation); Rev. Rul. 
67-286, 1967-2 C. B. 101 (transferred assets become used property for accelerated 
depreciation purposes). In Dearborn Gage, the Tax Court said: 
We recognize that, if petitioner had never been formed, and the prede-
cessor partnership had continued in business ... respondent would 
have been precluded by the express provisions of section 481 from mak-
ing any adjustments .... Thus, petitioner-a taxpayer separate and 
distinct from its predecessor-appears to fare worse than its predecessor 
would have. 
48 T.C. at 199--200. See also I.R.C. § 351(d) (investment companies); Rev. Rul. 
68--55, 1968--1 C.B. 140 (allocation of boot). 
1:!1 Note, Section 351 of the Internal Revmue Code and "Mid-Stream" Incor-
porations, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 96, 107-DS (1969). 
122 !d. 
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ceipt constitutes the taxable event.123 The only reason that the cash meth-
od taxpayer has a gain in its accounts receivable is that its method of ac-
counting permits a deferral of tax until the subsequent collection of those 
accounts. Thus, with respect to accounts receivable, the incorporation 
exchange does not accelerate the realization of income, as it does with 
respect to transfer of a business's fixed assets. Indeed, the extension of 
nonrecognition to accounts receivable has an effect nearly the reverse 
of section 3Sl's effect on the appreciation of fixed assets. Regarding 
fixed assets, section 351 prevents acceleration of income tax to the trans-
feror that, in the absence of incorporation, need not be incurred. Regard-
ing accounts receivable, however, nonrecognition relieves the transferor 
of an income tax that it otherwise would have been required to pay. In 
this context, to say that the corporation will be subject to tax on the 
income is no more of an answer to this objection than it is in any other 
context in which the assignment of income doctrine is applicable. 
Indeed, the district court in H empt recognized that "the question of 
non-recognition upon the exchange itself is distinct from the issue [of] 
whether the partnership or the corporation is taxable when collections 
upon transferred receivables are made. "124 Nevertheless, primarily for 
practical reasons, the court determined that the transferee should bear 
the tax. The court expressed concern that the transferor would be 
treated as receiving large amounts of income without any offsetting de-
ductions, since the deductions attributable to the income being taxed 
might have been previously taken.125 That a cash method transferor has 
received a substantial benefit through the deduction of expenses in ad-
vance of the receipt of the income generated thereby scarcely justifies 
extending a further benefit. Perhaps the court was concerned that the 
deductions attributable to the transferred accounts payable would be-
long to the corporate transferee, but that of course would not be the 
case.126 
The court also found it "anomalous" to tax the transferor on income 
that it would not in fact receive.127 It is at the core of the assignment 
of income doctrine, however, that the incidence of taxation does not 
necessarily follow the flow of cash. Although the receipt of cash is of 
some importance in the fashioning of the timing rules of the Code, such 
as those concerning realization and nonrecognition, it is irrelevant to the 
selection of the appropriate taxable person. Indeed, in this respect, the 
position of the cash method transferor is the same as that of the accrual 
method transferor, who has always been subject to tax on uncollected 
123 See note 20 supra. 
124 354 F. Supp. at 1176. 
125 !d. at 1178. 
126 See note 82 and accompanying text supra. 
127 354 F. Supp. at 1178. 
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accounts receivable transferred in a section 351 exchange. Both trans-
ferors will owe an income tax attributable to the preincorporation period 
and will find it necessary to withhold from the incorporation exchange 
sufficient cash or other assets to discharge that liability. Thus, no essen-
tial unfairness results from taxing the cash method transferor. More-
over, permitting the transferee to discharge this tax liability on behalf of, 
and without consequence to, the transferor extends an inequitable and 
inappropriate advantage to the cash method transferor that is not re-
quired by the policy of section 351. 
In addition, the district court in H empt128 referred to specific Code 
sections that contain statutory or regulatory provisions reducing the 
adverse impact of those sections in a section 351 exchange. Presumably, 
the import of these references is that, since Congress intended to relieve 
the transferor of tax in such instances, it also intended that the section 
351 transferor should not be taxed under the assignment of income doc-
trine. Yet the cited provisions support no such inference. One of the 
court's references was to section 381, which expressly shifts to the trans-
feree both the benefits and the burdens of taxation in an acquisitive re-
organization. The history of section 381 clearly refutes a congressional 
intent to treat section 351 exchanges in the same favored manner as 
such reorganizations.129 Furthermore, the court noted that, under sec-
tions 1245 (b) ( 3) and 1250( d) ( 3), the transfer of property in a section 
351 exchange does not precipitate the recapture of depreciation. The 
depreciation recapture sections, however, are characterization provi-
sions; they are designed to prevent the conversion of ordinary income 
into capital gain that results from taking excessive depreciation deduc-
tions against ordinary income and thereafter selling the property at a 
capital gain. If, however, gain is not recognized on a transfer, but rather 
is deferred through a basis adjustment, as in the case of a section 351 ex-
change, then there simply is no reason to recharacterize the gain.130 Ac-
cordingly, the depreciation recapture provisions also do not apply to 
gifts,131 although the assignment of income doctrine most surely does. 
Of greater relevance is the court's observation that in a section 351 
exchange the transferor of an installment obligation, the gain on which 
128 !d. at 1179 nn.14-15. 
129 See text accompanying notes 70--72 supra. 
130 If one accepts the proposition that recaptured depreciation represents an arti-
ficial reduction of income for prior years, the failure to recapture that income on a 
§ 351 exchange does in effect shift income from the transferor to the transferee. 
One justification for disregarding this effect is that computing the amount to be 
recaptured is difficult in the absence of a market transaction that establishes the 
value of the transferred property. This obstacle, however, will be surmounted when 
necessary to prevent the complete escape from tax of depreciation recapture. See, 
e.g., I.R.C. §§ 336, 1245(a)-(b). 
1s1 I.R.C. §§ 102(a), 1245(b) (1), 12SO(d) (1). 
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would be reported under section 453, is not subject to immediate taxa-
tion on the deferred gain inherent in the obligation.132 This exception is 
not statutory, but rather is found in the Treasury Regulations.133 It is 
consistent with the Internal Revenue Service's present policy but is an 
exception to the assignment of income doctrine. Regardless of whether 
this exception can be justified, it does not support the complete disregard 
of the assignment of income doctrine in section 35 1 exchanges. 
On the other hand, the district court in H empt summarily dismissed a 
suggestion by the taxpayer to draw an analogy to the rapidly expanding 
body of case law that has applied assignment of income principles to the 
liquidation of corporations. With certain exceptions, section 336 of the 
Code provides that no gain or loss shall be recognized by a corporation 
on the distribution of property in complete or partial liquidation, and 
section 337 provides that no gain or loss shall be recognized by a corpo-
ration on the sale of its properties in a complete liquidation. With ami-
nority of early cases to the contrary, 134 it is now firmly established that 
the assignment of income principles and the Commissioner's authority 
under section 446 prevail over the nonrecognition accorded by these 
sections.135 In order to reflect clearly the income of the liquidating cor-
poration, these authorities provide that a cash method corporation will 
be subject to tax on its accounts receivable whether or not they are dis-
tributed to shareholders under section 336 or sold pursuant to section 
337. Although the reasoning of the several courts that have considered 
this issue varies, in essence they have concluded that Congress intended 
only to eliminate the double taxation of appreciation inherent in the 
corporation's fixed assets that otherwise would occur if the appreciation 
were first taxed to the corporation on the sale or distribution and then 
taxed again to the shareholders in computing their gain on the liquida-
tion. In other words, Congress did not intend to exempt from tax the 
ordinary business income of the liquidating corporation.136 
In the context of a liquidation, the failure to apply assignment of in-
come principles to the transfer of accounts receivable and other current 
income items would be far more serious than the similar failure under 
132 354 F. Supp. at 1179 n.14. 
133 Treas. Reg.§ 1.453-9(c) (2) (1958). 
134 E.g., Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, Inc., 324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963). 
But see Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 44D (1975), 
aff'd, 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978); Rev. Rul. 77-f>7, 1977-1 C.B. 33. 
135 E.g., Midland-Ross Corp. v. United States, 485 F.2d 110 (6th Cir. 1973) ; 
Family Record Plan, Inc. v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. de-
nied, 373 U.S. 910 ( 1963) ; Commissioner v. Kuckenberg, 309 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 
1962), cert. dmied, 373 U.S. 909 (1963); Williamson v. United States, ?!J2 F.2d 
524 (Ct. Cl. 1961). 
136 Midland-Ross Corp. v. United States, 485 F.2d at 117. 
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section 351. If such items were not taxed to the corporation, they would 
never be subject to tax, except to the extent that an increase in the cor-
poration's value would increase the capital gain recognized by the stock-
holders upon liquidation. However, the perceptions that nonrecogni-
tion provisions should not bear on the taxation of ordinary business in-
come and that the assignment of income doctrine should prevail over 
such provisions are still entirely relevant to section 351. 
Under the assignment of income doctrine, the transferor in a section 
351 exchange should be taxed on transferred items of ordinary business 
income and expense. Since in principle the transferor should be taxed, 
rejection of the doctrine must be ultimately based on the belief that the 
tax cost of the doctrine's application would be so high that the incorpo-
ration of businesses would be significantly impeded. Any such impedi-
ment would presumably contravene section 351's policy of facilitating 
incorporation. The few cases that have considered the relationship be-
tween section 351 and the assignment of income doctrine have provided 
insufficient evidence to suggest that the doctrine's application would 
have an adverse impact on incorporations.137 By the same token, one 
would expect that before casting aside the protection of a basic rule of 
taxation the evidence of needed relief would be far greater than that re-
lied on by the court in H empt. 138 
If application of the assignment of income doctrine were to result in 
an undue increase in the cost of incorporating a business, relief of course 
would be warranted. Certainly, legislation could be tailored to provide 
no more than the necessary relief. 139 The present pattern of taxation, 
however, produces a distortion of income that goes far beyond any le-
gitimate need. The cumulative effect of section 357(c) (3) and Hempt 
is twofold. First, it relieves the transferor of all income-and denies it 
a deduction for all expenses-not properly includible in income on the 
date of the section 351 transfer. Second, it shifts the incidence of tax on 
all such items to the transferee. This dispensation is granted regardless 
of whether the transferor would be subject to tax on the exchange either 
137 In Arthur L. Kniffen, 39 T.C. 553 ( 1962), the cash method transferor had 
filed his return on the accrual method and only raised his objection to the assign-
ment of income doctrine in a claim for refund, perhaps in response to the deficiency 
asserted against him on other issues. In Raich, the accounts receivable considerably 
exceeded the accounts payable, 46 T.C. at 605; in Focht the reverse was true, 68 
T.C. at 225. 
138 354 F. Supp. at 1177-80. 
139 For example, Congress might determine not to impose a current tax on the 
amount by which the accounts receivable exceed the accounts payable. Taxation of 
such gain could be deferred as in § 358 (d), through a basis reduction in the stock 
received by the transferor. The tax ultimately imposed, however, should be at ordi-
nary income rates. Thus, a recapture provision would be needed to characterize the 
portion of any future gain that is attributable to the deferral. 
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under present law or pursuant to the assignment of income doctrine. 
Clearly, the breadth of this result cannot be justified by the desire to 
avoid the limited tax liability that otherwise would be imposed. 
C. Compatibility with the 1978 Legislation 
Prior to the precipitous amendment of Code sections 357 and 358, it 
was possible that the Raich problem could have been eliminated, and the 
pattern of taxing incorporation transfers improved, without the need for 
congressional intervention. The Internal Revenue Service could have 
applied the assignment of income doctrine through a reversal of its rul-
ing and litigation policies in the same manner as its present policy was 
adopted a decade ago. Had the Service reversed its position, it seems 
probable that the courts would have endorsed the application of the 
doctrine. 
In the 1978 legislation, however, Congress clearly assumed a pattern 
of taxation that disregards the assignment of income doctrine. To 
apply the doctrine now would render those amendments meaningless. 
It may thus be questioned whether the Service remains free to reverse 
its present policies and whether the courts are free to endorse such a re-
versal. 
The enactment of section 357 (c) ( 3) should not be regarded as pre-
cluding judicial adoption of the assignment of income doctrine. The 
Senate Report to section 357 (c) ( 3) contains no indication that Con-
gress knew the provision was in any way inconsistent with the applica-
tion of the assignment doctrine to section 351 exchanges. The new legis-
lation merely addressed the problem created by the failure to apply 
assignment of income principles to incorporation transfers; it surely 
does not follow that Congress would object if that problem disappeared. 
The adoption of section 357 (c) ( 3) does indicate that Congress thought 
the Raich decision imposed too great a tax burden on incorporation 
transfers. The tax cost of the Raich approach, however, is likely to be far 
greater than the tax cost of the assignment of income approach.140 More-
over, the tax imposed in Raich was clearly unfair. The suggestion here 
is that imposition of tax under the assignment of income doctrine would 
be far more equitable. Application of the doctrine would subject a cash 
140 Under Raich, the tax imposed is a function of the excess of all liabilities as-
sumed over the tax basis of all assets transferred. Thus, the amount of tax will de-
pend on the amount of accounts payable, but not on the amount of accounts receiv-
able. Under the assignment of income doctrine, the tax is a function of the accounts 
payable and receivable. Accordingly, in the extreme case of the transfer of only an 
equal amount of accounts payable and receivable, under Raich the tax would equal 
the amount of payables transferred, while under the assignment of income doctrine 
no net tax would result. On the other hand, a relatively small tax would be common 
under the assignment of income doctrine even though the total liabilities assumed 
did not exceed the basis of the transferred assets. 
96 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Volume 58, 1979] 
method transferor to tax consequences identical to those imposed up-
on an accrual method transferor. Since there is no indication that Con-
gress regards as unjust the impact of the incorporation provisions on an 
accrual method transferor, it should not be presumed that Congress 
would object if the same consequences were extended to all transferors. 
To conclude that the Ra.ich problem can still be solved without con-
gressional intervention is not to say that the present statutory pattern is 
acceptable. Even without regard to the assignment of income doctrine, 
sections 357 (c) ( 3) and 358 (d) ( 2) are at best incomplete and at worst 
superfluous and thus misleading. In order to achieve a rational statu-
tory pattern for taxing section 35 1 exchanges, Congress inevitably must 
reexamine the 1978 legislation. If Congress considers the tax positions 
of the transferor and the transferee, and the issues presented it:~- H empt 
as well as in Raich, perhaps the complexities created by Hendler can 
finally be satisfactorily resolved. 
CoNCLUSION 
The proper adjustment of the tax liabilities resulting from a section 
351 exchange is a difficult task. It would be facile to suggest that the 
solution proposed here is superior in every respect. The Internal Reve-
nue Service's policy of taxing the transferee has practical merit and will 
often not result in significant income distortion. Within this isolated 
framework, the best resolution of the Raich problem may be the one sug-
gested by Kahn and Oesterle and adopted in Focht and section 357(c) 
( 3). 
This approach, however, entails significant costs, by adding complex-
ity to the tax laws. Disregard of the assignment of income doctrine and 
the attendant disregard of the principle of discontinuity in this solitary 
area causes needless confusion. Continuity at the entity level is asserted 
to justify the transferee's reporting of income and expense, although for 
a variety of other purposes such continuity is lacking. No principle is 
offered for this distinction by which future disputes may be resolved. 
Furthermore, under the present policy the Service, with the acquies-
cence of the courts, will ta..x the transferor if the transaction would result 
in an excessive distortion of income. Since shifting income or expense 
to another is itself normally regarded as a distortion, it is difficult to pre-
dict when the distortion becomes excessive. Moreover, section 357 (c) 
( 3) 's redefinition of liabilities injects into an otherwise relatively simple 
provision an unnecessary interpretive complexity with unknown im-
plications for other transactions. 
If these special exceptions are necessary to achieve an important ob-
jective of ta..x policy, such as facilitating the incorporation of businesses, 
the tax law could accommodate these exceptions as it has many others. 
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Surely incorporations will be promoted by waiving a tax liability of the 
transferor, but it is not clear that the imposition of tax would materially 
burden such transactions. Even assuming a material burden, the relief 
presently granted is wholly disproportionate to the need. As such, the 
present relief is an unjustifiable subsidy, and the provisions granting it 
are an unnecessary source of complexity. 
This Article suggests that the overall pattern of taxation of incorpora-
tion transfers would be improved if the transferor were taxed under the 
assignment of income doctrine. This approach would conform the treat-
ment of incorporation transfers to the generally applicable principles 
of taxation and would avoid the increased complexity that the current 
alternative entails. 
